The FTC’s National Do Not Call Registry is quintessential government mediocrity. Registering a number is clunky, certain types of organizations are given a pass (like charities and political groups), and reporting a violation is a three page slog that can only be done through their website. No thanks.
One particularly creative solution comes from Jolly Roger Telephone Company, which was highlighted on episode 937 of the Tom Woods Show. It’s not an app like the others, but a “robot” that you can pass telemarketers off to (either through teleconference or the “simultaneous ring” feature if your carrier supports it). The robot then carries on a very convincing conversation, wasting the telemarketer’s time and reducing the number of people they get to annoy that day.
The court, in a 4-3 ruling, stressed that in consumer contracts in which basic rights are at stake, social-media companies cannot simply demand that their users sign away their rights to be heard in Canadian courtrooms.
Deborah Douez of Vancouver launched the lawsuit in British Columbia on behalf of up to 1.8 million Facebook members in 2012, accusing the company of using her name and portrait without her consent in an advertisement known as “Sponsored Stories.”
Ms. Douez told The Globe and Mail that she was thrilled by her legal victory. “I think if we don’t start standing up for our privacy rights, we’re going to lose them.”
Under British Columbia's Privacy Act, companies can be held liable for using the names or pictures of customers without their consent. Of course, Ms. Douez gave her consent when she signed up for Facebook. But, says Michael Geist, that doesn't matter because:
Last week’s ruling rightly recognizes the dangers of uneven bargaining power in online contracts and the reality that consumers regularly click away their rights.
Good luck defining "uneven bargaining power" in a court of law. But the real issue isn't Facebook's terms of service. It's mistaking privacy for a right. Facebook's data use terms don't violate anyone's privacy rights because privacy isn't a right.
Rights only exist as far as there is ownership. You own your own body. Thus, no one can physically harm or enslave you if you haven't first harmed or enslaved them. This is everyone's right. These same rights apply to everything you own. But you can’t “own” your privacy any more than you can own your name, or own an idea, or own the exclusive right to look at something.
But suppose, for the sake of argument, that privacy really is a right. There’s still no guarantee that your privacy rights will be enforced, or that they will be restored once violated. If someone steals your car, you may never get your car back, even though you pay taxes to fund a government that enacts laws about theft and pays policemen and investigators and judges and prison guards to carry out those laws. Preserving your rights requires resources, and resources cost money. Just as declaring health care a right doesn't magically make health care free, likewise, declaring privacy a right doesn't make it free. Making data privacy a federal or state law doesn't mean you now enjoy data privacy for free - it just means companies are now bearing the financial burden for it. It also means you’re paying the government (and making everyone else pay the government) to enforce your data privacy instead of some privately operated service.
As a consumer, I take issue with companies like Google and Facebook for all their fine-print and terms-of-service games, and with their data practices in general. But I'd rather preserve my "right" to privacy through voluntary means than forcing everyone to pay for and adhere to my privacy values through a monopolist government.
Yesterday, the European Commission (EC) announced a record $2.7 billion fine against Alphabet, alleging that Google violated antitrust law by “abus[ing] its market dominance as a search engine by giving an illegal advantage to another Google product, its comparison shopping service.” As with their decision to outlaw cellular roaming fees, however, the EC’s action again shows their clear disregard for what consumers actually want.
This disregard starts with how the E.U. differs from the U.S. in how it determines violations of antitrust law. As Ben Thompson explains in his thoughtful take on the judgment:
The United States and European Union have, at least since the Reagan Administration, differed on this point: the U.S. is primarily concerned with consumer welfare, and the primary proxy is price. In other words, as long as prices do not increase — or even better, decrease — there is, by definition, no illegal behavior.
The European Commission, on the other hand, is explicitly focused on competition: monopolistic behavior is presumed to be illegal if it restricts competitors which, in the theoretical long run, hurts consumers by restricting innovation.
As TechFreedom’s Berin Szóka points out, this way of thinking leads to the protection of less successful companies from more successful ones. It’s not about protecting consumers, as "[t]he EC doesn’t say a word about consumers. It simply claims that Google has hurt its rivals, who will now reap a windfall from this fine."
Thompson continues this argument:
On the other hand, isn’t consumer welfare the entire point? Sure, a narrow focus on price is perhaps a bad proxy, but if dominant services are winning by being better — which is my argument in Aggregation Theory — why should regulators busy themselves with demanding worse alternatives be given the right to succeed?
This is a point where many of those focused on the antitrust ends go wrong: in their crusade against big companies, they fail to grapple with the reality that on the Internet being big comes from being the best, leaving their arguments vulnerable to the critique that they are, in fact, anti-consumer, or at a minimum, anti-competence. To put it another way, in contrast to the previous point, regulators are treating people like dummies, assuming they can’t figure out how to find a competitive service, when in fact the truth is they don’t want to.
Then there’s the question of what Google should return when a specific product is searched for, if not ads and results pertaining to the specific product. Thompson makes two great points on this front:
First, if I search for a specific product, why would I not want to be shown that specific product? It frankly seems bizarre to argue that I would prefer to see links to shopping comparison sites; if that is what I wanted I would search for “Shopping Comparison Sites”, a request that Google is more than happy to fulfill.
The European Commission is effectively arguing that Google is wrong by virtue of fulfilling my search request explicitly; apparently they should read my mind and serve up an answer (a shopping comparison site) that is in fact different from what I am requesting (a product)?
The second reason is even more problematic: “Google Shopping” is not actual a search product; it is an ad placement.
You can certainly argue that the tiny “Sponsored” label is bordering on dishonesty, but the fact remains that Google is being explicit about the fact that Google Shopping is a glorified ad unit. Does the European Commission honestly have a problem with that? The entire point of search advertising is to have the opportunity to put a result that might not otherwise rank in front of a user who has demonstrated intent.
The implications of saying this is monopolistic behavior goes to the very heart of Google’s business model: should Google not be allowed to sell advertising against search results for fear that it is ruining competition? Take travel sites: why shouldn’t Priceline sue Google for featuring ads for hotel booking sites above its own results? Why should Google be able to make any money at all?
Even if you believe Google is a monopoly that has engaged in anticompetitive behavior in the past – as Thompson does – there’s little in this decision by the EC that can be celebrated as a win for the people of Europe. But perhaps believing the EC or E.U. actually exists to benefit them is an assumption worth questioning.
Big news: Europeans no longer have to pay cellular roaming fees when traveling across EU member states. TechCrunch reports:
The European Council yesterday adopted the legal act that limits how much mobile operators can charge each other — the final step in the multi-stage, multi-year process for the region’s lawmakers to agree an end to roaming charges for citizens. The ‘roam like at home’ policy will come into affect across the European Union from June 15.
Sounds wonderful, doesn't it? Nobody likes those pesky roaming fees, after all. We all know they're just another way for telecom providers to gouge us, right? Good thing the European Council stepped in to put a stop to this roaming fee nonsense! In fact, the EU is calling this "one of the greatest and most tangible successes of the EU."
But behind all the self-congratulation and media fanfare is a somewhat different story. The New York Times scratches the surface of it in the aptly headlined article, "Cellphone Roaming Charges End in Europe. Many Respond With a Yawn.":
Ms. Krastanova, 37, prefers to vacation in her native Bulgaria when she is not selling newspapers in Sofia, the country’s capital. Ms. Krastanova says she is too busy — and many of her compatriots too poor — to travel elsewhere in Europe.
“Paying the bills and providing for my 4-year-old daughter is our main priority. There is little left to splurge on trips abroad,” Ms. Krastanova said as she cross-stitched an elaborate pattern and sat in her newspaper kiosk, a cup of coffee and a pack of cigarettes resting next to her embroidery. “I don’t use roaming.”
Nor do many of her fellow Europeans. Almost two-thirds of Bulgarians have never traveled outside of their country’s borders, according to European Union statistics, and in another eight European states, including Greece and Italy, at least half of people polled also had not spent time abroad. And though other Europeans do jet across the Continent, many of those journeys also are limited to two-week summer vacations or short business trips.
The landmark policy shift, which enters into force on Thursday, comes as Europe faces pressure to speed up the overhaul of its wider digital economy to keep pace with the likes of the United States and China. But the experience of Ms. Krastanova, and many others like her, has many wondering why the region’s policy makers took 10 years — and invested significant political capital — to end roaming charges when it is not a daily concern for many of Europe’s 500 million citizens.
So most Europeans didn't actually care that much about roaming fees. But at least the telecom companies won't be able to gouge its customers for that evil thing called profit. Oh, but actually:
The biggest concern has been that the measure will push up the price of standard mobile contracts — meaning mobile users would be paying more domestically to subsidize the cost of cheaper calls and data when they’re on holiday. (Indeed, some EU operators took early opportunistic action to raise prices — blaming the incoming measure.)
Ms. Krastonova - trying to make ends meet for her and her 4-year-old daughter - will in all likelihood end up with a higher phone bill in order to keep costs down for those who travel frequently for business - people who, let's face it, are probably more well-off than Ms. Krastanova and can write off roaming fees as a business expense anyway. The poor subsidizing the rich: this is one of the EU's "greatest successes." Bravo.
If the "roam like at home" policy won't help most of Europe's working classes, and in fact may actually hurt them, why did the EU make this initiative a priority? For one thing, it's good PR. Ending roaming fees certainly sounds good on paper. But there's a deeper reason, about which the EU is perfectly transparent:
The European Commission first set out its intention to end mobile roaming fees in a 2013 reform plan, called the Telecoms Single Market initiative — a part of the DSM [Digital Single Market], so also aimed at boosting the region’s global competitiveness and fostering digital jobs by reducing market fragmentation.
The Union is fragmented into distinct national markets and as a result Europe is losing out on a major source of potential growth.
What is the EU's ultimate goal, and, by extension, the goal of its Digital Single Market initiative? To erase national borders and create a single European nation. Of course, such an achievement would be disastrous. How could anyone effectively govern people groups and cultures as diverse and geographically distant as France, Poland, Romania, Portugal, Ireland, and the Czech Republic? We're already seeing the deep social tensions forming in the US as a result of a federal government attempting to legislate for California the same way it does for Texas, Montana, and New Hampshire - and trying to subsidize some at the expense of others. The European project will end as badly, or worse.
But hey, at least Europeans no longer have to pay roaming fees.
Ars Technica reports:
The operator of a searchable piracy site for scientific research papers has been ordered to pay $15 million as fallout from a US copyright infringement lawsuit brought by one of the world's leading scientific publishers, New York-based Elsevier.
The site in question is Sci-Hub, created by Russian-born Alexandra Elbakyan. The plaintiff in the case, Elsevier, claimed Sci-Hub infringes on its subscription-based journal database, ScienceDirect, which is "home to almost one-quarter of the world's peer-reviewed, full-text scientific, technical, and medical content." Based on the 2017 subscription price list, buying subscriptions for all of the journals offered would cost you over $300,000 per year. So a full quarter of the world's latest research is protected by a massive paywall thanks to copyright law.
The punch line to this joke is the response of Maria Pallante, president of the Association of American Publishers (AAP):
As the final judgment shows, the Court has not mistaken illegal activity for a public good. On the contrary, it has recognized the defendants’ operation for the flagrant and sweeping infringement that it really is and affirmed the critical role of copyright law in furthering scientific research and the public interest.
No, the court hasn't mistaken illegal activity for a public good. On the contrary, it has mistaken a public good for an illegal activity! After all, Sci-Hub is only "illegal" because legislators have arbitrarily decided it is. There is no law of nature or rational thought process that would lead us to believe that sharing a non-scarce resource - knowledge - should be punished. The only arguments in favor of intellectual property law are utilitarian. Thus Pallante's claim that copyright law somehow "furthers" scientific research and public interest. But when has restricting the flow of information ever been beneficial for science? How has keeping information hidden ever served the public good?
In fact, the opposite is true. IP lawyer Stephan Kinsella writes:
Material progress is made precisely because information is not scarce. It can be infinitely multiplied, learned, taught, and built on. The more patterns, recipes, and causal laws that are known, the greater the wealth multiplier as individuals engage in ever-more efficient and productive actions. It is good that ideas are infinitely reproducible. There is no need to impose artificial scarcity on ideas to make them more like physical resources, which — unfortunately — are scarce. As Frédéric Bastiat observed, “All innovation goes through three stages. One possesses unique knowledge and profits from it. Others imitate and share profits. Finally, the knowledge is widely shared and no longer profitable on its own which thereby inspires new knowledge.”
Kinsella has documented all of the harm that IP law has caused society and the economy, so even on utiliarian grounds the pro-copyright camp loses the argument. But don't think that reason and facts will stop the state from keeping the IP racket going and continuing to bestow privileges on special interest groups (like the AAP) while pocketing a pretty penny in administrative costs for itself. Because in the end, copyright law isn't about justice or fairness. It's about money and power.
David Heinemeier Hansson, writing at Signal v. Noise:
The important thing to note here is that we don’t actually need Uber’s board to have an ethical epiphany for things to get better. Do you think that United’s CEO suddenly came to realize the prudence of treating his passengers with a modicum of respect because he saw the light? Come on. United, like Uber hopefully will, changed its policies because they felt no choice.
This is how we improve matters. Once the survival of a company, or at least its reputation, hangs in the balance, all sorts of impossible things suddenly become possible.
Pressure works. Every drip counts. Be a drop.
I harp on this a lot, but for good reason: many people believe government is the only way to keep businesses in line. This is not only untrue, but acutely harmful. Especially when there’s a better way that doesn’t require centralization of power, endless regulation, uncapped spending, or really anything other than what we already have: our ability to choose the businesses we support with our money.
Does it matter that Uber (or any business) only changes because of money, and not some “ethical epiphany”? Not really. I go out of my way to support certain businesses that share my worldview, but oftentimes it doesn’t matter how they’ve gotten to the place of offering a service I want. As long as it meets my standards for price, quality, convenience, sustainability – whatever is important to me in the decision-making process – I’m happy. And that’s a standard everyone can tailor precisely to their own wants and desires.
Mark Bergen, writing for Bloomberg:
Google is stopping one of the most controversial advertising formats: ads inside Gmail that scan users’ email contents. The decision didn’t come from Google’s ad team, but from its cloud unit, which is angling to sign up more corporate customers.
Alphabet Inc.’s Google Cloud sells a package of office software, called G Suite, that competes with market leader Microsoft Corp. Paying Gmail users never received the email-scanning ads like the free version of the program, but some business customers were confused by the distinction and its privacy implications, said Diane Greene, Google’s senior vice president of cloud. “What we’re going to do is make it unambiguous,” she said.
I have no doubt that this idea originated in the Google Cloud team’s discussions around selling G Suite to the enterprise. But it ultimately would not have been made if scanning Gmail still provided its ad business with worthwhile data. They likely get much more targetable data from other sources, such as search and browsing history. At this point, the potential revenue from selling more G Suite outweighs any loss on the ads side from not scanning Gmail.
It would be easy to write this off as Google once again trying to appear concerned about privacy when they really don’t. But even if they don’t, what matters is these enterprise customers do care enough to withhold their money (even through confusion). When the choice comes down to losing customers or meeting their demands, it’s not a hard decision.
Quoting Snowden from the transcript, courtesy of Zero Hedge:
People have said recently that privacy is what we used to call liberty, and then in the same breath they say that privacy is dead. What liberty is…is the right to self-determination. It’s the ability to have something that’s yours, rather than society’s.
This is codefied into our language, when we talk about private property, we’re talking about your right, your ability to have something that belongs to you. You decide how it’s going to be handled, you decide what color you want to paint your house, you decide what color shirt you’re going to wear - you don’t have to ask anyone.
Liberty is freedom from permission. It is the fountainhead from which all other rights spring.
Saying that you don’t care about privacy because you have nothing to hide is the same as saying you don’t care about free speech because you have nothing to say.
Adam Thierer reminds us of two decisions made 20 years ago this summer that allowed the Internet to become what it is today. First, the Supreme Court's Reno v. ACLU decision on June 26, 2017, which "struck down the Communications Decency Act’s provisions seeking to regulate online content under the old broadcast media standard." Second, the Clinton Administration's Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, released in July 1997, which "rejected a restrictive regulatory regime for commercial activities and instead recommended reliance on civil society, contractual negotiations, voluntary agreements, and industry self-regulation."
Thierer tempers his celebration with a word of caution:
Online platforms and digital technologies continue to come under attack from regulatory activists both here and abroad. Many governments continue to push back against these online speech and commercial freedoms, meaning we’ll need to redouble our efforts to highlight and defend the benefits of preserving these important victories.
Finally, as the underlying drivers of the Digital Revolution continue to spread into other segments of the economy, these freedoms will come into conflict with older top-down regulatory regimes for automobiles, aviation, medical technology, finance, and much more. This will create an epic conflict of governance visions between the Internet’s permissionless innovation model versus the precautionary, command-and-control regulatory regimes of the industrial age. We already see tension at work in policy deliberations over the Internet of Things, “big data,” driverless cars, commercial drones, robotics, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, virtual reality, the sharing economy, and others.
If you follow Bitcoin news, you know that the years-long scaling debate is quickly coming to a head with Sergio Lerner's recent SegWit2x proposal and the subsequent New York Agreement. But for the merely casual onlooker, all of the technical jargin about block size, coinbase strings, and user-activated soft forks can leave you feeling a little lost.
The thing to understand, as Erik Vorhees eloquently explains, is this:
…the unfortunate context in which [the scaling debate] is occurring is one of diminishing utility on the platform: transactions are getting more expensive and less reliable. The user experience of sending a Bitcoin transaction today is worse than it was two years ago. While the price has risen, fundamental utility has actually declined. This is unsustainable, and will be inevitably resolved by utility once again rising, or price declining to meet it.
In other words, everyone in the Bitcoin community has a vested interest in achieving scale so that a key value proposition or "utility" of the cryptocurrency - easy, secure transaction - doesn't get destroyed by the increasing cost of that transaction (because of finite network capacity and miner fees).
But despite everyone having skin in the game, finding a solution to the scaling problem hasn't been easy. It's certainly possible the whole Bitcoin experiment could go down in flames. You can think of it like a business, where everyone from the lowest employee to the chairman of the board is a stakeholder in the company's success. Yet businesses fail all the time due to poor management, lack of accountability, infighting, employee sabotage, and so on. This is why companies and thought leaders have become obsessed in recent years with the concept of alternative organizational models and "Enterprise 2.0," as they realize that the traditional, bureaucratic-hierarchical model that has dominated the past century no longer works in today's "flat" technological world.
So even if you don't understand the finer points of the SegWit2x proposal, you can appreciate it on a higher level as a fascinating case study in alternative organizational models and begin to think about how the Bitcoin model might be applied to - or even replace - current forms of government. Bitcoin developer Jimmy Song has written about how the bitcoin ecosystem is like the three branches of government, with developers being the legislative branch, miners being the executive branch, and users being the judicial branch. In a recent CoinDesk article, he also touched on its parallels with the democratic voting process:
While scaling is the reason everyone claims for this conflict, the actual reason may lie higher up. And when you think about the actual consensus process that's required to change bitcoin, it's clear that both sides want more control than they currently have…. This has brought us to the current impasse. Both sides want control, but given that bitcoin is a consensus-based system, there's no way to give each side what it wants and keep bitcoin on a single chain.
This sounds eerily similar to the current right-versus-left political gridlock in America, with both sides wanting to grab the power apparatus in Washington in order to force their vision of the future on the rest of the country. This is what inevitably happens in a democratic government. But the Bitcoin community is not a democracy, and the concensus approach to making coding changes to the blockchain protocol doesn't force everyone to accept the outcome - instead, it creates a "hard fork" where the minority are cut off from the main chain (Bitcoin Core, in this case) and must form a new chain. Whether this is a good or bad thing will depend on what side you're on and whether you're a miner, user, or investor. But it certainly offers the greatest amount of freedom. And when we talk about government, freedom is the only legitimate goal.
Courtesy of Wikipedia:
In economics and game theory, a participant is considered to have superrationality if they have perfect rationality (and thus maximize their own utility) but assume that all other players are superrational too and that a superrational individual will always come up with the same strategy as any other superrational thinker when facing the same problem. Applying this definition, a superrational player playing against a superrational opponent in a prisoner's dilemma will cooperate while a rationally self-interested player would defect.
Remember that in the prisoner's dilemma (where neither player can know the other's decision ahead of time), if both players cooperate, they both get a medium benefit. If both players betray or "defect," they both get a small benefit. If one of them cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets no benefit and the defector gets a big benefit. The problem, of course, is that because of the phenomenon of loss aversion, both players will always defect. Might this explain America's political gridlock?
But if superrationality is possible, the cycle of defection can be broken. If everyone in the Bitcoin community were superrational, they would all come to the same scaling solution and would all cooperate to make that solution happen. The question is, how do you promote superrationality?
One way that occurs to me is to allow for multiple prisoner's dilemma scenarios, like different blackjack tables in a casino, and allow participants to move from table to table. Eventually, the superrational players will all find one another and stick together, and all the defectors will be left to themselves. Once the defectors see the superrational players enjoying better returns, they'll be incentivized to join the superrational table. It will never be a perfect system, but it will be a system where the defectors are continually weeded out.
It would follow, then, that the best form of government is a sort of loose confederation of states or municipalities, with relatively easy movement across the municipalities. Think of the Swiss canton model, except without a state-controlled monetary system. As part of the confederation pact, municipal governments could only have a voluntary tax system using, for instance, Dominant Assurance Contracts. People who were unhappy with the number of non-cooperators in their municipality or who disagreed with the concensus vision could vote with their feet. In a word, the best government is radically decentralized.
As we watch the Bitcoin community wrestle through the tough questions and growing pains of a decentralized organizational model, I can't help but wonder if we're failing to see the broader lessons than can be learned and applied to our broken political system.
In considering whether the internet would exist without government funding, I concluded that not only would it likely still exist, but it really succeeded despite the government keeping it restricted for 26 years.
The internet wasn’t the only technology stunted by government involvement, however. As Thomas Winslow Hazlett explains in an article for Reason, the cell phone suffered the same fate at the hands of the FCC:
When AT&T wanted to start developing cellular in 1947, the FCC rejected the idea, believing that spectrum could be best used by other services that were not "in the nature of convenience or luxury." This view—that this would be a niche service for a tiny user base—persisted well into the 1980s. "Land mobile," the generic category that covered cellular, was far down on the FCC's list of priorities. In 1949, it was assigned just 4.7 percent of the spectrum in the relevant range. Broadcast TV was allotted 59.2 percent, and government uses got one-quarter.
Television broadcasting had become the FCC's mission, and land mobile was a lark. Yet Americans could have enjoyed all the broadcasts they would watch in, say, 1960 and had cellular phone service too. Instead, TV was allocated far more bandwidth than it ever used, with enormous deserts of vacant television assignments—a vast wasteland, if you will—blocking mobile wireless for more than a generation.
This is no surprise, as the FCC and government at-large don’t operate with market forces pushing them to be efficient or even successful. Instead, they prioritize specific industries and corporations, protected their interests and balance sheets from competition.
Minitel was a computer terminal. It housed a screen, a keyboard, and a modem—but not a microprocessor. Instead of computing on its own, Minitel connected to remote services via uplink, like a 1960s mainframe or a modern Google Chromebook. Terminals were given out, for free, to every French telephone subscriber by the state (which also ran the phone company).
Minitel was a huge success. With free terminals at home or work, people in France could connect to more than 25,000 online services long before the world wide web had even been invented. Many services of the dotcom-and-app eras had precursors in 1980s France. With a Minitel, one could read the news, engage in multi-player interactive gaming, grocery shop for same-day delivery, submit natural language requests like “reserve theater tickets in Paris,” purchase said tickets using a credit card, remotely control thermostats and other home appliances, manage a bank account, chat, and date.
Why is The Atlantic's Julien Mailland so enamored of this now-defunct technology? Because it was "open," of course. Since it was run by the government, all content and services were treated equally. We can all take a lesson from this, Mailland insists:
…Minitel’s lessons live on, and with new relevance. In the U.S., the Federal Communications Commission’s Open Internet Order made network neutrality law in 2015. But this year, it has come under attack by both cable internet operators and the current FCC chairman. The American implementation of a network derived from Minitel [known as 101 Online] was done by private industry alone. It failed in part because its usage was not regulated by the government. For this reason, it offers a view from the past on why the FCC’s move today might be misguided. It turns out that regulated networks might offer better market opportunities.
But was Minitel really a "huge success"? It helps to have some context, courtesy of Time:
In a nation that had a mere 5 million telephones in the mid-’70s — and where enduring the long wait to have a line installed was no guarantee it would actually work — the Minitel was an iconic part of France’s successful transformation from an underdeveloped communications and information-technology country into a cutting-edge innovator. To speed up that evolution, France Telecom handed out millions of Minitel terminals to businesses and households for free to use over an upgraded and expanded telephonic grid.
France had enjoyed the fruits of a nationalized telecommunications service since 1889, fruits such as long installation wait lists and shoddy service. More than eight decades of this government-run telecom service had left France technologically backwards. To improve its PR, France Telecom created Minitel (on the taxpayer's dime) and gave away millions of computers "for free" (again, on the taxpayer's dime). France still had horrible phone service, but nevermind that, they now had instant access to sex chat rooms where men could talk dirty to other men posing as women. I'm sure the droves of social conservatives out in France's vast countrysides loved having their tax dollars go to such a worthy cause.
Minitel was a "success" because it used taxes to provide a service half the country didn't want, essentially sticking a novelty cherry on top of the rotting cake of government-run telecom service. The sheen of this cherry rubbed off fast, as the rest of the world leapfrogged right over France a mere 10 years later with the advent of the privately-run, unregulated World Wide Web.
But rather than make the obvious comparison between Minitel and today's web, Mailland sidesteps the issue by comparing Minitel to 101 Online - Silicon Valley's early attempt at adopting Minitel. Mailland writes:
Individuals and companies couldn’t plug into the [101 Online] network and sell their content, goods, and services like their French counterparts had done, and as dotcom startups would soon do on the web [emphasis added]. Instead, they had to travel to 101 Online’s office in downtown San Francisco, hand a floppy to an operator, and wait for its content to be converted to 101 Online’s proprietary format and uploaded to the company’s server.
101 Online failed because of poor entrepreneurship and a bad business model, which the free market swiftly killed in favor of a better model, as Mailland himself notes. After meandering through this obscure history of failed internet prototypes, Mailland fails to tie it back to the question of an open internet. What Minitel or 101 Online has to do with net neutrality rules is anyone's guess.
What can we learn from articles like this one? Simply this: Advocates of net neutrality have to actively ignore obvious facts and rely on obscure examples to justify their position. To everyone else, the superiority of the private sector over the public sector in meeting people's needs is obvious, and it requires no special contortions of evidence or logic.
Courtesy of Merriam-Webster:
State \ˈstāt\ a politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory
Nationality \ˌna-shə-ˈna-lə-tē\ a people having a common origin, tradition, and language
A nation arises from the self-identifcation of its people with one another. From where does the state arise? The dictionary definition gives us no actor performing the action. We come upon it in medias res, as it were: it is somehow already "politically organized." But by whom? For what reason?
Keep this distinction in mind as you read the following from the EFF on the troubling origins of the 1917 Espionage Act:
On September 25, 1919, the 28th President of the United States Woodrow Wilson gave his final address in support of the League of Nations in Pueblo, CO and in his speech, he spoke of American immigrants with hyphenated nationalities: “Any man who carries a hyphen around with him carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this Republic whenever he gets ready.” Wilson specifically targeted Irish-Americans and German-Americans, whom he perceived to be disloyal immigrants and potential spies.
Thus, the Espionage Act was born against the backdrop of World War I and amidst fears of subversion of American democracy. Its primary purpose was to deal with avoidance of the draft, sabotage of state activities, and espionage. But its subsequent interpretations led to the punishment of socialists, pacifists, and other anti-war activists. Most infamously during this period, former Presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs was sentenced to 10 years in prison for a 1918 speech, denouncing the Espionage Act of 1917.
The Espionage Act was further modified by the Sedition Act of 1918 but those amendments were ultimately overturned on March 3, 1921, when World War I ended. The Sedition Act sought to criminalize statements during the war that were “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive…about the form of government of the United States.”
The goal of the Espionage Act - which whistleblowers such as Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden have been charged with violating, and which is now being threatened against WikiLeaks - was never to protect national security, that is, the nation's security. It was to silence criticism about the state's involvement in the Great War. It was closely followed by the Sedition Act, whose express purpose was to silence any kind of government criticism at all.
If the state and the nation were the same thing - as the state would have us believe - then the Espionage Act wouldn't exist. If the state and the nation are distinct, but the state is accountable to the nation (we the people), the Espionage Act still wouldn't exist. It is only if the state is unaccountable to the nation and acting in its own, distinct interests that something like the Espionage Act could come to be. Since the Espionage Act does exist, the conclusion is simple.
The state can only arise when the fear of a greater power justifies the creation of an equally great power to defend against it. This is why the world powers continually stoke fear among its citizens about other world powers, or else tout the benefits of creating global political unions. But the state's real enemy is its own citizens, who will revolt if the illusion of government "by the people, for the people" is ever broken.
The EFF wants you to sign a petition telling U.S. policymakers to reform the Espionage Act. But this only perpetuates the illusion that we still have the power to hold the government accountable.
Simon Black, writing at Sovereign Man and syndicated at Zero Hedge:
This one is almost too ridiculous to believe.
Recently a new bill was introduced on the floor of the US Senate entitled, pleasantly,
“Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017.”
You can probably already guess its contents.
Cash is evil.
Bitcoin is evil.
Now they’ve gone so far to include prepaid mobile phones, retail gift vouchers, or even electronic coupons. Evil, evil, and evil.
These people are certifiably insane.
Among the bill’s sweeping provisions, the government aims to greatly extend its authority to seize your assets through “Civil Asset Forfeiture”.
Jason Hiner has a provocative piece over at ZDNet titled “Yes, Blockchain could reverse the course of civilization and upend the world’s most powerful companies.” Does the premise hold any merit? Hiner gives a 20,000-feet view of how blockchain tech could disrupt at least four industries: banking, energy, music, and journalism. He ends the article:
We have to consider the fact that Blockchain could rewrite some of the rules of capitalism, which naturally favors concentrations of wealth. [Co-author of Blockchain Revolution Alex] Tapscott thinks of it not so much as redistributing wealth as “pre-distributing” it by opening up more opportunities to more people, by default.
I agree with all but the part about rewriting the rules of capitalism. Actually, Hiner has struck on something quite profound, though he may not even realize it. What he thinks is a revision of capitalism might actually be the culmination of capitalism: private ownership of the means of production at a radically individual level. Socialists have always feared that capitalism concentrates wealth within the “capitalist” class – those who have the access to capital necessary for mass production. But what if mass production was simply a step in the process of capitalism until newer technologies (created thanks to capitalism) made the mass production system obsolete?
Perhaps Hiner makes the mistake, as many do, of equivocating capitalism with mass production. But mass production is only one possible model within a capitalist economy. The only prerequisite of capitalism is private ownership of scarce resources. How that plays out in the free market is limited only by technology and the human imagination. In fact, we know that, despite talking about it in aggregate terms, “consumer demand” is always specific and individual. There is no “demand,” there are only millions of demands – as many as there are consumers. If we could get a product that met our exact specifications at an acceptable price, we would. Mass production is the best system we’ve come up with so far to meet a general cluster of demands in a cost-efficient way. But that’s changing.
With the advent of 3D printing, there is a real possibility that in the not-too-distant future, we can make our own products that meet our own particular specifications without needing a large corporation to produce it for us. With the blockchain protocol, we can run a one-man taxi service without even needing Uber to mediate and verify the exchange of trust. We can make a product in our basement, sell it on a decentralized app, verify the transaction on the blockchain, and ship the product via our personal drone to a buyer across town. We can become self-employed entrepreneurs who don’t need large amounts of capital, extensive infrastructure, or an established employer to generate a living income. And none of this violates the fundamental rule of capitalism: private ownership.
We’ve always assumed that capitalism creates a wide income inequality gap. But the advent of decentralizing technology may reveal that capitalism’s true nature is to diminish inequality and favor the “little guy” after all.
For everything Bruce Schneier has contributed to freedom through security and cryptography, you’d think he’d have a little less faith in government intervention. But as we’ve seen before, calling for the government to protect us has become quite natural for him – particularly when it comes to the internet of things (IoT).
A recent op-ed of his in The New York Times entitled What Happens When Your Car Gets Hacked? continues to sound the alarm, concluding, “As politically untenable as it is, we need government to step in to create the market forces that will get us out of this mess.”
Once again, the folks at the Mercatus Center have a sound rebuttal:
First, it's important to note that the traditional software industry has been able to provide security without such government intervention, as Schneier himself stated. This did not happen overnight. With time, and trial and error, technology firms were able to build out the knowledge and labor pool needed to quickly patch software vulnerabilities. After all, providing good security is an important way that businesses compete. Companies that lag behind on security will take a reputational hit and eventually be left in the dust by companies that prioritize security. It is not perfect, but it represents a superior approach to imposing a "Department of Internet Security" for devices.
The problem with creating such a federal bureaucracy is that we could expect the rate of new innovation to slow considerably. Subjecting businesses to expensive pre-market approval introduces compliance costs and uncertainty that many small firms simply can't bear. This has been the case with Food and Drug Administration regulation, where most new pharmaceuticals are introduced by a handful of huge companies that can withstand the years-long, multi-million dollar regulatory process.
They continue with a counterpoint that strongly rebukes any call for the government to regulate or protect something they so obviously violate themselves (i.e., protecting our privacy, which they blatantly invade through mass surveillance):
Furthermore, we would need to trust such an agency to have the wherewithal to promulgate appropriate security guidelines in the first place. As Mercatus Center research has pointed out, federal agencies have consistently failed to meet their own security guidelines and suffer record numbers of information security breaches each year. It is hard to imagine that the federal government can improve the security of our nation's devices when it cannot even get its own house in order.
Finally, is Schneier truly unaware of non-government solutions to IoT security like Cloudflare’s Orbit? Or is he ignoring them because they don’t fit his narrative?
In case you’re worried that we’ve gone soft on Google in defending their planned ad filter and rebutting calls to break them up – both of which were more in defense of the free market – I’m here to squash any lingering fears.
Following news that Apple will soon be adding “intelligent tracking prevention” to its Safari web browser, Alan Toner wrote a piece for EFF reflecting on the two approaches:
In other words, while Chrome will simply be filtering out certain invasive ads from being displayed, Safari will be preventing the much more troubling issue of online tracking. I still believe Chrome’s approach, on its own, will provide a slightly better browsing experience for the average person who doesn’t know any better, but it’s not even worth considering if you actually care about privacy and/or use an existing ad blocker.
This all goes to show how Apple – which makes its money from selling actual products and services – legitimately cares about privacy. They’re not in the business of selling ads or building algorithms that feed off personal data, so they have no conflict with subverting such practices. They don’t have to make a tradeoff when it comes to privacy.
Unlike Google, who is merely virtue signaling when they say they care about privacy.
I have plenty of issues with Google and their sneaky data usage rules. I'm also a little suspicious of their origins. So my rebuttal to Jonathan Taplin's recent New York Times article, "Is It Time to Break Up Google?", is not on the grounds of defending Google per se, but of defending the free market. Because, as we've said before, Google is powerful because we, consumers, give it power. To turn around and attack its ubiquity in our lives and doomsay about a vague, unsubstantiated threat of monopoly, seems to me either ignorant or disingenuous. But I'll get to that.
In just 10 years, the world’s five largest companies by market capitalization have all changed, save for one: Microsoft. Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Citigroup and Shell Oil are out and Apple, Alphabet (the parent company of Google), Amazon and Facebook have taken their place.
They’re all tech companies, and each dominates its corner of the industry: Google has an 88 percent market share in search advertising, Facebook (and its subsidiaries Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) owns 77 percent of mobile social traffic and Amazon has a 74 percent share in the e-book market. In classic economic terms, all three are monopolies.
Taplin does a fine job setting up his bogeyman. "Google, Facebook, and Amazon are monopolies! Monopolies are bad!" But he can't be bothered to provide us with the "classic economic" definition of monopoly to which he refers. That's because he doesn't use the classic economic definition at all.
mo·nop·o·ly / məˈnäpəlē / noun: the exclusive possession or control of the supply or trade in a commodity or service.
Monopoly status has nothing do with a company's ranking on the stock market. That I even have to point this out shows Taplin has little real economic understanding. In classic economic terms, none of these companies are monopolies. But even if they were, assuming they became monopolies without any prior government favoritism enabling their monopolization (a hypothesis that history doesn't bear out), their monopoly status wouldn't be a bad thing. Because in a free market, a company that becomes a monopoly does so by doing what it does significantly better, faster, and cheaper than anyone else. Billions of people around the world freely choose to use Google, Facebook, and Amazon because they serve our wants incredibly well. Google Maps can recalculate my route in seconds based on real-time changes in traffic patterns. I can order one of millions of products on Amazon and have it delivered to my door within two hours! And I can do all of this from a smartphone that would have cost me $620,000 less than three decades ago. If these companies are monopolies, boy did they earn it!
We have been transported back to the early 20th century, when arguments about “the curse of bigness” were advanced by President Woodrow Wilson’s counselor, Louis Brandeis, before Wilson appointed him to the Supreme Court. Brandeis wanted to eliminate monopolies, because (in the words of his biographer Melvin Urofsky) “in a democratic society the existence of large centers of private power is dangerous to the continuing vitality of a free people.” We need look no further than the conduct of the largest banks in the 2008 financial crisis or the role that Facebook and Google play in the “fake news” business to know that Brandeis was right.
Actually, the 2008 financial crisis was the product of the Fed's easy-money policies and unsound legislation like the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 that "'persuaded' lenders, Mafioso style, to lend to low-income borrowers, against their better judgment," as Robert Stewart puts it. The result was that government-backed entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "subsidized mortgages for people who, under more-prudent rules of borrowing, would never have qualified for a loan from a conservative banking institution."
As for fake news, it strikes me that the only people who seem to think this is a big problem are politicians and liberal news publishers like the New York Times. The rest of us - that is, actual consumers of news - don't seem to care all that much. Perhaps because we know that "fake news" is just the cosmopolitan class's shorthand for anything it disagrees with. And Taplin doesn't bother to draw any clear connection between this alleged fake news problem and the topic at hand. Breaking up Google won't stop fake news.
Could it be that these companies — and Google in particular — have become natural monopolies by supplying an entire market’s demand for a service, at a price lower than what would be offered by two competing firms? And if so, is it time to regulate them like public utilities?
As I said, if they can meet consumer demand at a lower price than competitors, what exactly is the problem? We have to regulate them because they're doing an excellent job? This kind of backward logic can only make sense to someone who believes monopolies create the need for regulation, when in fact regulation creates monopolies. But instead of providing a rigorous defense of his assumption, Taplin simply tries to make a government-controlled monopoly look better than a free-market monopoly:
AT&T (also known as the Bell System) had its rates regulated, and was required to spend a fixed percentage of its profits on research and development. In 1925 AT&T set up Bell Labs as a separate subsidiary with the mandate to develop the next generation of communications technology, but also to do basic research in physics and other sciences. Over the next 50 years, the basics of the digital age — the transistor, the microchip, the solar cell, the microwave, the laser, cellular telephony — all came out of Bell Labs, along with eight Nobel Prizes.
This begs the question: would these technologies not have been developed had telecommunications remained a private market? Would we to this day still be calling each other on rotary phones and transmitting business data via telegraph had the government not stepped in? Or would we be more technologically advanced than we are? Taplin wouldn't be able to answer this either way, which just goes to show his argument here is based on an unprovable assumption - like arguing that blacks would still be enslaved today had the Civil War not occurred.
In a 1956 consent decree in which the Justice Department allowed AT&T to maintain its phone monopoly, the government extracted a huge concession: All past patents were licensed (to any American company) royalty-free, and all future patents were to be licensed for a small fee. These licenses led to the creation of Texas Instruments, Motorola, Fairchild Semiconductor and many other start-ups.
Taplin shoots himself in the foot here by claiming that a benefit of turning a company into a public utility is that the government can force it to license out its patents for free. But the only reason private companies can hoard their ideas is because of the patent system that the government created! Put another way, Taplin is arguing that creating public utilities fosters innovation by allowing the government to lift its own anti-innovative patent laws. Using his own logic, I can think of a much easier way to spur innovation: end the patent system.
We are going to have to decide fairly soon whether Google, Facebook and Amazon are the kinds of natural monopolies that need to be regulated, or whether we allow the status quo to continue, pretending that unfettered monoliths don’t inflict damage on our privacy and democracy.
Notice how Taplin's argument has subtly changed. He started out suggesting these companies were monopolies. Along the way he slipped in the word "natural." But even those who believe in the monopoly myth draw a clear distinction between market monopolies and natural ones. The latter are services that require substantial infrastructure-building and high upfront capital costs such that having competing services is wasteful and "duplicative." No one could seriously argue that a search engine, social media platform, or online retailer are "natural" monopolies. Taplin's imprecision with terms undermines the logical flow of his argument. We simply can't take him seriously.
It is impossible to deny that Facebook, Google and Amazon have stymied innovation on a broad scale. To begin with, the platforms of Google and Facebook are the point of access to all media for the majority of Americans. While profits at Google, Facebook and Amazon have soared, revenues in media businesses like newspaper publishing or the music business have, since 2001, fallen by 70 percent.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, newspaper publishers lost over half their employees between 2001 and 2016. Billions of dollars have been reallocated from creators of content to owners of monopoly platforms. All content creators dependent on advertising must negotiate with Google or Facebook as aggregator, the sole lifeline between themselves and the vast internet cloud.
Taplin throws Amazon in the mix without so much as a nod to why it deserves to be on the list of companies that are hurting publishers and other content creators - another shining example of Taplin's precision and rigorous logic. So we can dismiss Amazon and focus on Google and Facebook. Taplin tells us that billions of dollars have been "reallocated," which is a clever way of removing from his equation the actual culprit for these lost revenues: consumers. News publishers like the New York Times with their outdated and failing business models are having their revenues "reallocated" by consumers who no longer wish to buy what they're selling. Why would they, when they can get it for free? Taplin's response is not to accept the fate of the free market, but rather to force consumers to continue paying for their content by releasing the government hounds on smarter, more innovative companies.
It’s not just newspapers that are hurting. In 2015 two Obama economic advisers, Peter Orszag and Jason Furman, published a paper arguing that the rise in “supernormal returns on capital” at firms with limited competition is leading to a rise in economic inequality. The M.I.T. economists Scott Stern and Jorge Guzman explained that in the presence of these giant firms, “it has become increasingly advantageous to be an incumbent, and less advantageous to be a new entrant.”
It would be nice to know what Obama's advisers, or Taplin for that matter, consider to be a "supernormal" return on capital. 20 percent? 50 percent? 1,000 percent? Here we get the central planner's worn-out finger wag about companies being "too" profitable. The referenced paper claims that high-earning companies pay their workers more than low-earning companies within the same industry, which contributes to rising wage inequality. Yes, obviously - and why is that a bad thing? We should expect unequal wages because companies are paying a premium to attract higher-quality workers in order to keep producing high-quality and innovative services, which thus allows them to earn a higher margin. Google doesn't get the smartest workers by paying $10 an hour.
That's not to mention the fact that these companies have provided the platforms on which innumerable new businesses have grown, new jobs have been created, and workers outside of these companies have increased their incomes. Of course, such factors never make it into these economists' analyses.
Now Taplin gives us the antidote:
There are a few obvious regulations to start with. Monopoly is made by acquisition — Google buying AdMob and DoubleClick, Facebook buying Instagram and WhatsApp, Amazon buying, to name just a few, Audible, Twitch, Zappos and Alexa. At a minimum, these companies should not be allowed to acquire other major firms, like Spotify or Snapchat.
The second alternative is to regulate a company like Google as a public utility, requiring it to license out patents, for a nominal fee, for its search algorithms, advertising exchanges and other key innovations.
Taplin cites vertical acquisitions - i.e. buying a company in a related industry to expand service offerings - rather than horizontal ones - that is, buying out a direct competitor. Vertical acquisitions don't create monopolies. Of course, neither do horizontal ones, but Taplin doesn't bother to build an intelligent case either way.
The third alternative is to remove the “safe harbor” clause in the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which allows companies like Facebook and Google’s YouTube to free ride on the content produced by others. The reason there are 40,000 Islamic State videos on YouTube, many with ads that yield revenue for those who posted them, is that YouTube does not have to take responsibility for the content on its network.
Here's another easy bogeyman to invoke: ISIS. Yes, says Taplin, we must break up Google because of all that unethical money it makes from those ISIS videos! But if we consider that YouTube racks up 5 billion views per day, taking down those 40,000 ISIS videos would hardly put a dent in YouTube's ad revenues, much less Google's. Taplin is grasping at straws here.
Removing the safe harbor provision would also force social networks to pay for the content posted on their sites. A simple example: One million downloads of a song on iTunes would yield the performer and his record label about $900,000. One million streams of that same song on YouTube would earn them about $900.
Taplin ignores three obvious holes in his reasoning. First, one million streams does not equal one million people. Second, people who would stream a song for free might not buy the song if it weren't. If I bought all the songs I listened to on YouTube and Spotify, I'd be in deep debt. Third, there's no way of knowing how much revenue an artist generates in MP3 purchases and ticket sales because his or her music was first available for free streaming. Business models have to adapt when a new technology disrupts an industry, or else companies will die. You can't expect people to pay for content the same way they paid for records and printed newspapers 40 years ago.
I’m under no delusion that, with libertarian tech moguls like Peter Thiel in President Trump’s inner circle, antitrust regulation of the internet monopolies will be a priority. Ultimately we may have to wait four years, at which time the monopolies will be so dominant that the only remedy will be to break them up. Force Google to sell DoubleClick. Force Facebook to sell WhatsApp and Instagram.
Again, what's wrong with market dominance when we all benefit from the services these companies provide? Well, not all of us benefit. The execs at the New York Times certainly don't. Not that I'm insinuating this is some sort of propaganda piece…
To sum it up, I echo a sentiment left by a reader in the comments section: this article is just a solution looking for a problem.
Google recently announced plans to include an ad “filter” in its Chrome web browser starting early next year. It’s not a “blocker” because it will allow some ads through: those deemed worthy by the Coalition for Better Ads, of which Google is a member. Their awkwardly titled Initial Better Ads Standards shows examples of intrusive ads that will be filtered, including pop-ups, auto-playing videos with sound, full-screen countdowns, and more. Although unconfirmed, it’s believed that the ad filter will be enabled by default when it ships in Chrome.
Additionally, Google announced a tool called “Funding Choices” that, when added by a publisher to their website, prompts visitors running other ad blockers to either disable the ad blocker or pay a fee to access the content.
The contradiction in this is blatantly obvious to anyone who follows Google (or its parent company, Alphabet): they make almost 90% of their revenue from selling ads. Their own ads, of course, meet the aforementioned standards and won’t be filtered, which is where this story gets interesting. Compound that with the fact that Chrome commands over 50% of the browser market share, and some would have us believe we have a full-blown conspiracy on our hands.
Like David Dayen, writing for The Intercept:
So this is a way for Google to crush its few remaining competitors by pre-installing an ad zapper that it controls to the most common web browser. That’s a great way for a monopoly to remain a monopoly.
There’s more to the story, however. The real goal for Google appears to be not just blocking ads sold by other digital suppliers besides Google, but to undermine third-party ad blockers, which stop Google ads along with everyone else’s.
Web users will quickly recognize their only options: pay to use the internet, or uninstall the ad blockers and surf the web for free. At least 11 percent of all web users, and perhaps as many as 26 percent of all desktop users, have third-party ad blockers on their devices, a number that will likely grow in the next few years.
The argument undergirding Dayen’s entire piece – as well as less sensational takes – is the power and control Google wields. On that, I couldn’t agree more. But if that’s the argument, then let’s not waste time attacking every little move Google makes – let’s cut to the root cause and how it can be remedied.
While the U.S. government has played their part, the majority of Google’s success can be attributed to consumers choosing to use their products. Lots of people choose to exchange their personal data for “free” search, “free” email, “free” analytics, etc. Google has attained its power and control through people giving it to them. The remedy, then, isn’t breaking them up or regulating them into submission, but something much more straight-forward: deliberately choosing not to use Google. Every one of us has the power to opt-out and protect ourselves; it doesn’t require waiting on any government to do that for us. Perhaps firstname.lastname@example.org should consider some of the alternatives before railing against the very problem he’s helping proliferate.
Once the issue of power and control is set aside, the idea of an ad filter in Chrome makes sense. Like every business, Google is responding to the changing market. They see consumers increasingly choosing to use ad blockers for a better browsing experience, and they see how that threatens their primary revenue stream. What business wouldn’t try to adjust for this? They have to continue to provide what consumers want in a way that makes money for them to survive. Google could have outlawed ad blockers in Chrome completely, or started charging for their products instead of relying on ad revenue, but they know people would have left in droves. They had to strike a balance that mutually benefitted both parties, which is what they did. Consumers get a better browsing experience, and Google keeps its revenue stream intact. And just like Google, the invasive ad networks and sites that use them will have to adjust to the changing market to survive. I have no doubt the majority will.
I've written before on the concept of blockchain-based communities. It turns out people are already experimenting with this on a global scale. Marketing itself as "Governance 2.0," BITNATION is kind of like a digital nation whose citizens (it appears there are about 6,000 total) span several physical nations. This digital nation comprises many smaller, loosely affiliated nations, and when you become a citizen you have the option of joining an existing nation or creating a new one. From the Nations Directory page:
When our Pangea software reaches Beta stage, you’ll be able to transfer Your Nation onto the Pangea “Blockchain Jurisdiction”, a DIY Governance Client that will enable you to operationalise Your Nation, on a smart contract powered, peer-to-peer and end-to-end encrypted platform.
Sounds cool, except that when you actually browse the Nations Directory, you find that each citizen is basically his or her own nation at this point. There are also embassies and consulates, though I can't imagine they hold any real power with the physical country in which they're located. As a BITNATION citizen, you get access to several services, including Refugee Emergency Response, Citizen Security, an Education Network, and a BITNATION Bitcoin debit card. For kicks, here's a summary of its security services, which are offered through third-party provider Dragonfly:
Dragonfly has exceptional expertise in providing security in challenging situations, close protection, extraction and medical evacuation and kidnap and ransom support. Through a wide network of community supporters and professional risk advisers we enable BITNATION citizens the freedom to live their lives without security concerns, and provide 24/7 crisis management services when needed.
BITNATION even has its own space agency, which "aims to create and explore open source hardware and software for Do-It-Yourself space exploration" in partnership with SpaceChain Space Agency. Not a joke!
At this point, I'd consider BITNATION little more than an amusing curiosity. If nothing else, it shows a growing desire of individuals around the world to move away from tyrannical political entities and return to that crazy, radical idea that people have a right to self-determination and self-governance. To echo Murray Rothbard:
The right of self-determination in regard to the question of membership in a state thus means: whenever the inhabitants of a particular territory, whether it be a single village, a whole district, or a series of adjacent districts make it known, by a freely conducted plebiscite, that they no longer wish to remain united to the state to which they belong at the time, but wish either to form an independent state or to attach themselves to some other state, their wishes are to be respected and complied with. This is the only feasible and effective way of preventing revolutions and civil and international wars.